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INTRODUCTION
When the Obama-era Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) issued the Open Internet Order, establishing net neutrality rules,
its action had the side effect of handing the FCC responsibility for
policing the data-protection practices of broadband internet access
The Commission took an
providers (“broadband providers”).1
aggressive approach to broadband privacy—pursuing the first-ever
privacy enforcement action against a broadband provider, and passing
what was likely the most stringent prescriptive data-privacy regulation
in American history to date. But the FCC’s patrol of the privacy beat
was short-lived. Following the election of President Donald Trump,
the Commission’s new Republican majority suspended the broadband
privacy rules, and Congress later scrapped them altogether. The
Commission subsequently repealed the Open Internet Order, a move
that had the collateral effect of restoring jurisdiction over broadband
privacy to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
While the FCC’s detailed privacy rules are no longer, they
continue to inspire debate. Several state legislatures have taken up the
issue of whether they should enact their own broadband privacy rules,
modeled after the repealed federal regulations.2 In addition, the FCC’s
rules provide a helpful jumping-off point for analyzing the existing
state of broadband-privacy enforcement, and for assessing the shape
that enforcement should take under the FTC. The privacy practices of
broadband providers have largely flown under the radar, with the
practices of “edge providers”3 such as Google and Facebook receiving
1. The Open Internet Order reclassified broadband as a common-carrier service under
Title II of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. In re Protecting and Promoting the Open
Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5604-5607 (2015) [hereinafter Open Internet Order]. This
indirectly stripped the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of jurisdiction to police broadband
providers’ privacy practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act, because Section 5 does not
apply to common carriers. See 15 U.S.C. § 45; see also infra Part I at 104–09.
2. See Ernesto Falcon, Legislative Analysis, How Silicon Valley’s Dirty Tricks Helped
Stall Broadband Privacy in California, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Oct. 23,
2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/10/how-silicon-valleys-dirty-tricks-helped-stallbroadband-privacy-california [hereinafter Falcon, Broadband Privacy in California].
3. Edge providers are firms that use the broadband network to provide content,
applications, and other services to end users. See Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at
5608.
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the lion’s share of attention from consumer advocates, media outlets,
academics, and regulators. But large broadband providers’ ability to
collect data on individuals are approached by those of only a handful of
firms, and their privacy practices are accordingly worthy of attention.
This Article seeks to untangle some of the knottier issues
regarding broadband privacy. Part I provides a brief introduction to
privacy issues that have arisen in the broadband space.4 Part II offers
the first comprehensive comparison between the FCC’s repealed
broadband privacy rules and the FTC’s likely enforcement of
broadband privacy under its authority to police unfair and deceptive
trade practices.5 Privacy advocates lamented the loss of the FCC as a
broadband-privacy enforcer, apparently assuming that FTC
enforcement would not be as robust. However, looking to past FTC
enforcement actions and policy statements to anticipate the
Commission’s likely approach to broadband privacy, this Article posits
that the FTC’s enforcement regime is actually likely to be quite similar
to the FCC’s aborted regulation in most respects. While there are a
couple of points on which FTC regulation will probably be less
stringent, this fact will likely benefit consumers on the whole by
fostering competition in nearby data-intensive markets. Moreover, the
FTC’s loose, standards-based procedural approach is preferable to the
FCC’s highly prescriptive rules because it provides needed regulatory
flexibility in a rapidly evolving area.
A number of questions remain about the details of how the FTC
will enforce privacy standards against broadband providers. Part III
examines three particularly pressing questions.6 First, should privacy
standards be enforced differently against broadband providers than
against other firms? That is, do broadband providers’ market positions
and access to data, as well as the relative lack of visibility of their datacollection practices, justify the application of stricter privacy rules?
Second, should the FTC make an exception to its privacy standards for
the practice of scrutinizing Internet traffic in order to provide different
treatment to different types of content and applications? Conversely,
should the Commission use its privacy rules as a backdoor means of
“net neutrality” regulation? Third, how is the FTC’s enforcement of
broadband providers’ privacy practices likely to play out on the
ground?

4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
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I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO BROADBAND PRIVACY
There has been much discussion of the ability of so-called “edge
providers” such as Google and Facebook to monitor user behavior
online. 7 Until fairly recently, however, comparatively little attention
has been paid to the implications of data collection by broadband
internet access providers—firms like AT&T, Comcast, and Time
Warner that provide access to substantially all Internet endpoints at
speeds faster than dial-up, through wired connections and/or cellular
networks.8
Internet service providers (ISPs) have been testing various
monitoring practices for years, but have usually backed away from
collecting customers’ data following detection, bad publicity, and legal
action. The first public attempt by a stateside telecommunications
(telecom) provider to collect, store, and process user data for
advertising purposes came in 2008, when Charter partnered with a firm
called NebuAd to collect and analyze information on broadband
customers’ browsing behavior, using the information to help content
providers target advertisements to web users.9 A consumer backlash
followed, however, and Charter quickly suspended its plans.10
In 2011, two Berkeley computer scientists discovered that ISPs
were tracking consumers’ use of certain search terms for marketing
purposes.11 The providers again quickly announced that they were
dropping the practice.12
Most recently, reports emerged in 2014 that Verizon Wireless had
injected unique identifiers known as tracking headers or
“supercookies”13 into the Internet traffic of over 100 million customers
7. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free Speech in
the Age of Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1525 (2012).
8. 47 CFR § 8.2(a).
9. Saul Hansell, Charter Suspends Plans to Sell Customer Data to Advertisers, N.Y.
TIMES (June 24, 2008), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/24/charter-suspends-plan-tosell-customer-data-to-advertisers/.
10. Id.
11. Jim Giles, US Internet Providers Hijacking Users’ Search Queries, NEW SCIENTIST
(Aug. 9, 2011), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20768-us-internet-providershijacking-users-search-queries/.
12. Id.
13. “Supercookies” refers to unique identifiers inserted into the headers of users’ web
traffic in order to track users across the web and serve targeted advertisements to them. In
re Cellco P’ship d/b/a Verizon Wireless, 31 FCC Rcd. 1843, 1847 (2016) [hereinafter
Verizon Order]. They are known as “supercookies” because users cannot easily delete
them, as they can with the cookies that websites use to track users. See Robert McMillan,
Verizon’s ‘Perma-Cookie’ Is a Privacy-Killing Machine, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2014),
https://www.wired.com/2014/10/verizons-perma-cookie/.
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on its mobile network.14 This practice allowed Verizon and its partners
to gather data on the web-browsing habits of those customers, and
made it impossible for customers to prevent the tracking except by
encrypting their web traffic or using a virtual private network (VPN).15
A subsequent FCC investigation found that Verizon had begun
inserting tracking headers into internet traffic as early as 2012.16
AT&T acknowledged that it had also engaged in the practice, and
agreed to desist.17 The FCC eventually filed a complaint against
Verizon, and the parties reached a settlement.18
Shortly thereafter, the FCC began developing comprehensive rules
governing broadband providers’ collection, storage, and use of
customer data.19 At least in theory, broadband privacy had previously
fallen within the FTC’s regulatory domain, pursuant to the
Commission’s capacious authority to police “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce” under Section 5 of the FTC Act.20
However, the FCC’s 2015 reclassification of broadband as a commoncarrier service pursuant to Title II of the Communications Act21
indirectly stripped the FTC of its privacy jurisdiction over broadband
providers, because Section 5 does not apply to common carriers.22
Accordingly, the FCC reasoned that it would have to assume
responsibility for broadband privacy if it wished to avoid a “gap” in the
American privacy regime.23
In the days leading up to the 2016 presidential election, the
Obama FCC rolled out its Broadband Privacy Order, a 169-page
whopper (excluding appendices) that covered the collection, storage,
and use of customer data by broadband providers.24 The order was
short-lived, however. Before it went into effect, the FCC stayed it in
14.
15.
16.
17.

Verizon Order, supra note 12, at 1847–51; see also McMillan, supra note 12.
Id. at 1847–51.
Id.
Elizabeth Weise, AT&T Ends Tracking of Customers by “Supercookie,” USA
TODAY (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/11/14/att-supercookiestracking/19041911/.
18. Verizon Order, supra note 12, at 1843–44.
19. In re Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications Services, 31 FCC Rcd. 2500, 2508 (2016) [hereinafter Broadband
Privacy NPRM].
20. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
21. Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at 5604–07.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
23. In re Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications Services, WC Docket. No. 16–148, 2016 WL 6538282, 14051 (2016)
[hereinafter Broadband Privacy Order].
24. See generally id.
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part.25 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed and President Trump signed
legislation repealing it.26 The other shoe dropped when the Trump
FCC repealed the Open Internet Order, terminating the classification of
broadband providers as common carriers and thereby restoring the
FTC’s jurisdiction over those providers’ privacy practices pursuant to
Section 5.27
Consumer advocates met the repeal of the FCC’s rules with
dismay. “Today’s vote means that Americans will never be safe online
from having their most personal details stealthily scrutinized and sold
to the highest bidder,” Jeffrey Chester, executive director of the Center
for Digital Democracy, told The Washington Post.28 Obama holdovers
at both the FCC and FTC issued a press release calling the move “the
antithesis of putting #ConsumersFirst.”29 State legislators introduced
bills to reinstate the FCC’s rules at the state level.30
Meanwhile, the newly installed Republican chairs of the FCC and
FTC urged people not to believe the “hyperventilating headlines”
warning of dire privacy consequences.31 They asserted that the FCC’s
rules would have distorted competition in the Internet ecosystem, and
that returning privacy jurisdiction over broadband providers to the FTC
25. In re Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications Services, 30 FCC Rcd. (2017), https://transition.fcc.gov/
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0301/FCC-17-19A1.pdf [hereinafter Protecting the
Privacy of Customers].
26. Steve Lohr, Trump Completes Repeal of Online Privacy Protections from Obama
Era, N.Y. TIMES (April 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/technology/trumprepeal-online-privacy-protections.html. The Trump FCC had stayed the order the day
before it was scheduled to go into effect. Protecting the Privacy of Customers, supra note
24.
27. FCC, In re Restoring Internet Freedom, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and
Order, 2018 WL 305638, at *8–10, *23–26 (Jan. 4, 2018). Note that the repeal order might
be subject to challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable and
Telecom. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005) (agency action
arbitrary and capricious where agency fails to adequately explain reasons for change of
course).
28. Brian Fung, The House Just Voted to Wipe Away the FCC’s Landmark Internet
Privacy Protections, WASH. POST (March 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/28/the-house-just-voted-to-wipe-out-the-fccs-landmarkinternet-privacy-protections/.
29. Press Release, Joint Statement of FCC Commissioner Mignon Clyburn and FTC
Commissioner Terrell McSweeny, FCC (Mar. 23, 2017), https://transition.fcc.gov/
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0323/DOC-344042A1.pdf.
30. See Falcon, Broadband Privacy in California, supra note 2.
31. Ajit Pai & Maureen Ohlhausen, No, Republicans Didn’t Just Strip Away your
Internet Privacy Rights, WASH. POST (April 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/no-republicans-didnt-just-strip-away-your-internet-privacy-rights/2017/04/04/
73e6d500-18ab-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html.
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would ensure a “comprehensive framework that will protect . . .
privacy throughout the Internet.”32
Part II evaluates these competing claims in comparing the FTC’s
likely enforcement of broadband privacy to the FCC’s Broadband
Privacy Order. First, however, understanding the issues in play
requires a rudimentary technical understanding of broadband
providers’ ability to monitor the traffic that flows through their
networks.
When a user types a web address into her browser, the broadband
provider transmits the website’s contents from the edge provider to the
user in the form of “packets.”33 Each of these packets carries data
about the site.34 The packets are reassembled when they reach the user
to form intelligible content.35
Each packet contains several different types of information. Two
are relevant to our purposes. First, packets contain “headers,” which
convey an internet protocol (IP) address that tells the broadband
provider where it must route the packet.36 Second, packets contain an
“application payload,” which transmits the substance of the data being
conveyed.37
In inserting supercookies into customers’ traffic, Verizon and
AT&T only interacted with the headers of packets, appending a unique
identifier to the address information.38 If the recipient website had an
arrangement with the broadband provider, the website could match the
identifier to a particular user and access the provider’s store of
information about that user.39 It could then use that information to
serve the user relevant ads.40
The header is the only part of the packet a broadband provider
must read in order to route traffic.41 However, carriers have also
32. Id.
33. JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 42 (1st ed. 2007).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Duncan Geere, How Deep Packet Inspection Works, WIRED (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/how-deep-packet-inspection-works.
37. Id.
38. Jacob Hoffman Andrews, Verizon Injecting Perma-Cookies to Track Mobile
Customers, Bypassing Privacy Controls, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Nov. 3,
2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/11/verizon-x-uidh; see also Jacob Davidson,
Verizon and AT&T Snooping on Customers’ Web Activity, TIME (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://time.com/money/3556165/verizon-att-supercookies/.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Geere, supra note 34.
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developed the ability to examine the payload of the packet.42 This
practice is known as “deep packet inspection,” or “DPI.”43 It has
attracted much attention from data-privacy advocates, because it
enables broadband providers to view potentially sensitive contents of
messages sent by users—for example, e-mails, chats, and information
entered into web forms.44 However, the practice is not yet costeffective or widely used, and by some accounts may never be.45 Nick
Feamster, professor of computer science at Princeton University, has
called DPI a “red herring” in discussions of broadband privacy because
it remains too expensive to be widely used,46 notwithstanding dramatic
declines in data-storage costs in recent years.47 AT&T and Verizon
have insisted that they do not use deep packet inspection for marketing
purposes, and would not do so without first seeking affirmative express
consent from customers.48 Accordingly, broadband providers’ ability
to track users’ movements around the web via packet headers appears
to be the more pressing privacy issue at the moment.49
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Letter from Nick Feamster, Professor, Dep’t of Computer Sci., Princeton U., to
Chairman & Comm’rs of the Fed. Comm. Comm’n, RE: Docket. No. 16-106, Protecting the
Privacy of Customers of Broadband and other Telecommunications Services 6 (May 27,
2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60002079367.pdf [hereinafter Feamster Comment Letter].
46. Id.
47. John Hagel et al., From Exponential Technologies to Exponential Innovation,
DELOITTE Figure 2 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://dupress.com/articles/from-exponentialtechnologies-to-exponential-innovation/ (noting drop in data storage costs $569 to $0.03 per
gigabyte between 1992 and 2002).
48. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE 55 (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-tradecommission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/
120326privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC PRIVACY REPORT ].
49. The Future of Privacy Forum has stated that “the types of data that are available
and being used for ad targeting today are quite visible and widely available.” Reply
Comments from the Future of Privacy Forum to Fed. Comm. Comm’n on WC Docket. No.
16-106, FCC 5, (Jul. 6, 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10706083993286/FCC%
20Reply% 20Filing%20-%207.6.16.pdf. Broadband providers appear poised to exploit webbrowsing and application-usage information. See Comments of AT&T Servs. Inc., In re
Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and other Telecommunications Services,
WC Docket. No. 16-106, at 60 (May 27, 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60002080023.pdf
[hereinafter AT&T Comment Letter]; Rich McCormick, Verizon Will Share your Browsing
Habits with AOL’s Massive Ad Network, THE VERGE (Oct. 6, 2015),
https://www.theverge.com/2015/10/6/9468025/verizon-will-share-your-browsing-habitswith-aols-massive-ad-network; Brian Fung, Internet Providers Want to Know More about
You than Google Does, Privacy Groups Say, WASH. POST. (Jan. 20, 2016) (describing a
“land-grab for ad targeting technology”), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2016/01/20/your-internet-provider-is-turning-into-a-data-hungry-tech-company-
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Broadband providers have been experimenting with collecting
user data for years. It is only recently that the practice has attracted
serious regulatory attention, however. The next section delves deeper
into the FCC’s plans to regulate broadband privacy under Title II of the
Telecommunications Act, and the FTC’s likely approach under Section
5 of the FTC Act.
II. COMPARING THE FTC AND FCC APPROACHES
While defenders and opponents of the FCC’s Broadband Privacy
Order alike seem to agree that the FCC’s rules marked a significant
departure from the FTC privacy framework,50 the analysis offered here
suggests that the FTC’s substantive approach is in fact likely to be
quite similar to the FCC’s. The only significant difference is the type
of consent broadband providers are required to obtain from users
before collecting web-browsing and app-usage data. While the FCC’s
rule may have been somewhat more privacy-protective, the FTC’s
substantive standards are preferable in terms of overall consumer
welfare because they are more likely to encourage competition in
nearby data-driven markets. In addition, the flexibility afforded by
Section 5 of the FTC Act is preferable to the FCC’s rulemaking
approach when it comes to broadband privacy, because it will enable
the FTC to adjust its privacy standards amid rapid technological
change, as the costs and benefits of data collection become clearer.
A. FCC Broadband Privacy Order
The FCC’s short-lived Broadband Privacy Order remains the most
detailed regulatory assessment of the issues surrounding broadband
privacy to date. This section describes the statutory authority on which
the FCC’s order was based, and details the substance of the FCC’s
order.
1. Statutory Authority
While the Telecommunications Act of 1996 contains provisions
that apply more clearly to data privacy than does the FTC Act, the
FCC’s statutory authority in the privacy realm is likely more limited
than the FTC’s. The FCC located the authority for its Broadband
Privacy Order in § 222 of the Telecommunications Act.51 Section 222
consumer-groups-warn/.
50. See Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, at 210 (Pai, Comm’r, dissenting).
51. See 47 U.S.C. § 222.
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provides that “[e]very telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect
the confidentiality of proprietary information of, and relating to, other
telecommunication
carriers,
equipment
manufacturers,
and
52
customers.” The provision bars dominant telecom carriers from using
other carriers’ information for any purpose other than to facilitate
interconnection with the network.53 It also limits carriers’ ability to use
and disclose information pertaining to customers.54
The Broadband Privacy Order expanded the scope of the FCC’s
previous interpretations of § 222 in two major ways. Most obviously,
the order brought broadband services within § 222’s reach; previously,
the section had only applied to wireline telephone providers.55
The order also expanded the types of customer information
subject to § 222. Scholars often divide privacy statutes between those
that protect communicative attributes, and those that protect
communicative content.56 Until the FCC’s recent aggressive privacy
enforcement, § 222 was considered an example of the former.57 The
clearest indication that § 222 was designed to protect communicative
attributes rather than content is its use of the term “customer
proprietary network information” (CPNI), rather than the term
“personally identifiable information” (PII).58 PII is typically invoked
in statutes meant to protect content information.59 The FCC had
previously held that CPNI, in contrast, covered information kept on file
by telephone companies, such as addresses, bills, and “pen register”
information (e.g., the number called, the time of a call, and the duration
of a call).60 This is classic “attribute” information.61 Indeed, in prior
orders, the FCC had explicitly stated that “call content information is
not considered CPNI.”62
52. Id. § 222(a).
53. Id. § 222(b).
54. Id. § 222(c).
55. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, at ¶ 1.
56. See Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes after the Digital
Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 950–52 (1996).
57. See Fred H. Cate, Privacy and Telecommunications, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1,
40 (1998) (describing 47 U.S.C. § 222 as protecting “communication attributes” rather than
content).
58. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c).
59. See Freiwald, supra note 54, at 1014–16. For instance, the Telecommunications
Act protects the personally identifiable information of both satellite and cable subscribers.
47 U.S.C. §§ 338(i)(1)(A), 551.
60. In re Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 22 F.C.C. Rcd.
6927, 6975–76 (citing app’x B subpart U.2) (2007).
61. See Freiwald, supra note 54, at 953–55.
62. In re Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd. 12513,
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The Broadband Privacy Order, however, interpreted § 222 as
protecting content, requiring the Commission to significantly expand
its interpretation of the statute.63 The FCC did so in two significant
ways. First, it broadened the definition of CPNI, holding that CPNI
now included “any part of the substance, purport, or meaning of a
communication.”64 Second, the Commission held that the § 222
covered more categories of information than just CPNI—insisting that
it protected “customer proprietary information” (PI), as well.65 The
Commission described PI as all the data to which broadband providers
have access “in connection with their provision of service”66—that is,
every piece of customer data, more or less. This included information
such as names and addresses that the Commission had previously
excluded from its definition of CPNI.67 This was a dramatic reinterpretation of the statute. It marked a departure from earlier orders
interpreting § 222 in the telephony context, and finds no support in the
FCC’s Computer Inquiries—the rulemaking proceedings in which the
terms “customer proprietary information” (PI) and “customer
proprietary network information” (CPNI) first appeared, where the
Commission used the terms interchangeably.68
Assessing the validity of the FCC’s interpretation of § 222 is
beyond the scope of this Article. It is merely worth noting that the
FCC appeared to be covering its bases in finding overlapping grants of
authority so that its rules could survive even if a reviewing court
rejected part of the Commission’s interpretation of § 222.69 Indeed, the
Commission even established a backstop in case a court invalidated its
interpretation of § 222 entirely, maintaining that Title II’s general antidiscrimination and “reasonable rate” provisions, in addition to other
sections of the Telecommunications Act, provided independent
authority for its privacy rules.70

12532 (1996).
63. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 6.
64. Id. ¶ 102.
65. Id. ¶¶ 85–87.
66. Id. ¶ 266.
67. Id. ¶ 95.
68. Id. ¶ 369.
69. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 102 (noting that content is protected
both as CPNI, and as an independent category); see also id. ¶ 353 (“Even assuming a
contrary reading of Section 222(a), subsection (c) would still invest the Commission with
substantial regulatory authority over personal information that BIAS providers and other
telecommunications carriers collect from their customers . . . .”).
70. Id. ¶ 297.
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2. Privacy Provisions
The FCC built its order around the notice-and-choice framework
so familiar in American privacy law. It laid the groundwork by
adopting a notably broad conception of the harm occasioned by
broadband providers’ collection, storage, and use of customer data,
finding that the threats posed by such practices included “not only
identity theft or financial loss but also reputational damage, personal
embarrassment, or loss of control over the exposure of intimate
personal details.”71 The FCC especially relied on the last item—loss of
control—to justify far-reaching privacy protections, tailoring its rules
to guard against not only improper uses of customer information, but
also the mere act of collecting and storing data.72
a. Notice
The Commission laid out nuanced requirements for both the type
of information privacy notices must contain, and the manner in which
notices must be presented to consumers.73 First, it required broadband
providers to inform potential customers of their privacy practices at the
point of sale to give them a fair chance to decide whether or not to
subscribe to the service.74 It also mandated that privacy policies
“clearly and accurately inform” customers of all material privacy
practices,75 and that the policies be readable—“written and formatted in
ways that ensure the material information in them is comprehensible
and easily understood.”76
The rules further required the notices to give customers
information about the types of data collected; how data would be used;
with whom and for what purposes data would be shared; and how
customers could exercise choices regarding data collection.77 The
Commission specifically required providers to reassure customers that
refusing to authorize data collection would not result in "degraded
service."78
The FCC also mandated that providers make their privacy policies
easily accessible through their websites and applications,79 and that
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. ¶ 266.
Id. ¶¶ 267, 379–80.
Id. ¶¶ 122–65.
Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 138.
Id. ¶ 134.
Id. ¶ 147.
Id. ¶ 122.
Id. ¶ 134.
Id. ¶ 8.
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they present the choice mechanism simultaneous with the notice.80
Finally, the Commission required carriers to notify customers in
advance of material retroactive changes to their privacy policies.81
b. Choice
The FCC also spelled out the form of customer approval carriers
were required to obtain in order to collect, use, and share certain types
of information.82 These choice provisions were what occasioned much
of the controversy around the Broadband Privacy Order.
The Commission placed data-related practices into one of three
categories of required approval: (1) “opt-in” choice, that is, practices
for which carriers were required to obtain express affirmative consent;
(2) “opt-out” choice, that is, practices carriers had to enable customers
to avoid if they so chose; and (3) practices that did not require any form
of choice.83 In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”), the
Commission had initially suggested more lenient treatment of
providers’ collection of data for certain types of first-party marketing,84
but it scratched this proposal in the final rule.85
At first glance, the difference between opt-in and opt-out choice
may not seem particularly significant. In practice, however, the
distinction is quite important. As Commissioner Michael O’Rielly
noted in dissenting from the FCC order, approval schemes basically
function as property rules, given that most customers ignore privacy
notices and simply stick with the default setting.86 Opt-in choice tends
to vest this property right in the customer, opt-out choice in the
collector.87
The Commission decided to require opt-in approval for
“sensitive” data, which it defined to include the content of
communications, as well as web-browsing and application-usage
history and their “functional equivalents”—a catch-all term that would
give the Commission flexibility to regulate new types of interfaces
emerging with the so-called “Internet of Things” (a term used to
describe physical objects that send and receive data over the web).88
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 133.
Id. ¶ 195.
Id. ¶¶ 166–234.
Id. ¶ 9.
See Broadband Privacy NPRM, supra note 18, at 2532.
Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶¶ 199–200.
Id. at 216 (O’Rielly, Comm’r, dissenting).
See id.
Id. ¶¶ 181, 185. The Commission also classified certain types of information as
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The Commission also required opt-in consent for material retroactive
changes to privacy policies.89 It mandated opt out approval for all
other forms of data gathering, save those expressly exempted in
§ 222.90
The FCC also stated that it would allow firms to pay customers to
opt in to data collection.91 However, the Commission cautioned that it
was prohibiting “take-it-or-leave-it offering[ings] [of] . . . broadband
service contingent on customers surrendering their privacy rights.”92 It
did not specify how exactly it would evaluate when payment for data
would rise to the level of a violation, saying only that it would step in if
customers were “essentially compelled to choose between protecting
their personal information and very high prices.”93
3. Security Provisions
Finally, the Commission imposed requirements relating to data
security and data-breach notification.94 It required carriers to take
“reasonable measures” to ensure the security of customers’ data,95
declining to impose more specific requirements because it recognized
that “what constitutes ‘reasonable’ data security is an evolving
concept.”96 And it required providers to notify the FCC, Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Secret Service within seven
business days of any data breach, unless the breach posed “no
reasonable risk of . . . harm.”97 It modeled this requirement on state
data-breach-notification statutes.98
B. Likely FTC Regulation of Broadband Privacy
It is difficult to make an apples-to-apples comparison between the
FCC’s and FTC’s regulation of broadband privacy, given the
sensitive, such as Social Security numbers and medical data, id. ¶ 9, but these categories
were arguably redundant given the inclusion of content, browsing history, and app usage
history.
89. Id. ¶ 195.
90. Id. ¶ 9.
91. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 298–303.
92. Id. ¶ 294–97.
93. Id. ¶ 303.
94. See generally id. ¶ 235–60.
95. See generally id. ¶ 238–47. The Commission did not detail practices that would
meet this standard. It suggested that it was essentially incorporating the FTC’s approach to
data security, as it has developed in dozens of Section 5 enforcement actions. See id. ¶ 240.
96. Id. ¶ 236.
97. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 264, 278.
98. Id. ¶ 264
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commissions’ divergent approaches. While the FCC enshrined its
planned regulation in a detailed rule, the FTC, for all intents and
purposes, lacks rulemaking authority.99 Instead, it enforces privacy
requirements pursuant to the open-ended mandate of Section 5 of the
FTC Act, which condemns “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.”100
Accordingly, in order to discern the likely shape of the FTC’s
enforcement of broadband privacy, we must look to the Commission’s
past privacy-enforcement actions and policy statements. The FTC has
detailed its views on privacy best practices in guidelines, press releases,
workshops, and white papers—documents that Professors Woodrow
Hartzog and Dan Solove describe as “soft law,” similar to dicta in
judicial opinions.101 In addition, the FTC has brought so many privacy
actions that its interpretation of Section 5’s standards has hardened into
rule-like form, as Hartzog and Solove have argued.102 While its
privacy settlements lack precedential force, the FTC “has demonstrated
a commitment to remaining consistent in practice.”103
Analyzing the FTC’s enforcement actions and policy statements
enables us to understand how the Commission might enforce Section 5
against broadband providers now that it has the authority to do so, and
points up areas where the Commission’s approach will need further
development. It also reveals that the difference between the two
commissions’ approaches may be slighter than either privacy advocates
or objectors to the FCC’s rules have supposed.
1. FTC Statutory Authority over Broadband Privacy Practices
The FTC does not have specific statutory authority to regulate
data privacy. Instead, it brings privacy actions pursuant to its general
99. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 620 (2014) [hereinafter Solove & Hartzog, New
Common Law] (“[F]or Section 5 enforcement – one of the largest areas of its jurisprudence
– the FTC has only Magnuson-Moss rulemaking authority, which is so procedurally
burdensome that it is largely ineffective.”).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
101. Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law, supra note 97, at 625–26; see also FTC v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 616–17 (D. N.J. 2014).
102. Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2232 (2015); Solove & Hartzog, New Common
Law, supra note 99, at 586, 607 (“Technically, consent orders legally function as contracts
rather than as binding precedent. Yet, in practice, the orders function much more broadly
than a contract between a company and the FTC. In the world of privacy law practice,
everything the FTC says and does is delicately parsed, like the statements of the Chairman
of the Federal Reserve.”).
103. Solove & Hartzog, New Common Law, supra note 97, at 620.
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consumer-protection powers under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which
declares unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”104 A practice is deceptive if it involves (1) an act
(representation, omission, or practice) that would (2) deceive a
reasonable consumer in a manner that is (3) material.105 Meanwhile, a
finding of unfairness requires (1) a substantial injury (2) without
offsetting benefits that (3) consumers cannot reasonably avoid
themselves.106
A recent ruling by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has thrown the FTC’s ability to enforce
Section 5 against telecommunications firms into some doubt.107 While
Section 5 applies generally to “persons, partnerships, or corporations,”
it exempts several classes of firms from its scope.108 Among these are
“common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce.”109 The
FTC has long maintained that this provision does not deprive it of
Section 5 authority over the non-common-carrier services of firms that
otherwise operate as common carriers.110 For instance, under the
FTC’s interpretation, the common-carrier exemption would prevent the
Commission from enforcing Section 5 against AT&T’s wireline
telephone operations—which the FCC regulates as a common-carrier
service under Title II of the Communications Act—but would allow it
to apply Section 5 to AT&T’s wireless services, which Title II does not
cover.111
The Ninth Circuit panel rejected this interpretation, however.112
In the first federal appellate opinion to consider the issue, the panel
held that a firm which engaged in any regulated common-carrier

104. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
105. Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, FTC, to Hon. John D. Dingell,
Chairman, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted in In re
Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 1984 WL 565319, at *45–50 (1984) (decision &
order).
106. Letter from FTC Comm’rs to Wendell H. Ford & John C. Danforth, Senators (Dec.
17, 1980), reprinted in In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1984 WL 565290, at *97
(1984); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
107. FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), reh'g en banc granted,
No. 15-16585, 2017 WL 1856836 (9th Cir. May 9, 2017).
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
109. Id.
110. See Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Fed. Trade
Comm’n to the Fed. Comm. Comm’n, WC Dkt. No. 16-106, FCC 16-39 at 3 fn. 6 (May 27,
2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60002078443.pdf [hereinafter FTC Comment Letter].
111. AT&T Mobility, 835 F.3d at 995–98.
112. Id. at 1003.
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activity was entirely exempt from regulation under Section 5.113 Thus,
under the Ninth Circuit decision, the FTC would be barred from
bringing a Section 5 complaint against AT&T’s (non-common-carrier)
broadband services because the FCC regulates AT&T’s wireline
telephony services under Title II.114 However, the circuit has since
reheard the case en banc, vacating its opinion.115 It appears likely that
the court will agree with the FTC’s longstanding interpretation on
rehearing.
2. The FTC’s Substantive Approach to Broadband Privacy
Data-privacy advocates have suggested that there are three major
points on which the FTC’s regulation of broadband privacy will differ
from the FCC’s since-aborted approach. First, they note that the FTC
generally has not required consumer approval for first-party
marketing,116 whereas the Broadband Privacy Order did not allow for
such an exception.117 Second, they point out that the FTC generally
only requires customers’ opt-in approval for collecting information
classified as “sensitive,”118 whereas the FCC would have required optin approval for collection of all content data.119 Finally, they observe
that the FTC typically does not mandate any form of approval for
tracking users’ web-browsing and app-usage habits, whereas the FCC
would have required opt-in approval for this practice.120
However, the FTC’s statements about the privacy practices of
broadband providers strongly suggest it will enforce broadband privacy
in a manner that is largely consonant with the FCC’s rules. Though
many of the commenters in the FCC broadband privacy proceeding
appeared to assume that the FTC would take the same approach in
enforcing Section 5 against broadband providers as it does against
other firms,121 in fact the Commission has given strong indications that
113. Id. at 998.
114. See id. at 995–98.
115. AT&T Mobility, 2017 WL 1856836.
116. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 40–42.
117. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 9.
118. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Frostwire, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-23643, at ¶¶ 22–32, ¶¶ 41–43 (S.D. Fla. Oct.
7,
2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/10/
111011frostwirecmpt.pdf [hereinafter Frostwire Complaint]; FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra
note 48, at 58–60.
119. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 5.
120. Frostwire Complaint, supra note 117, at ¶¶ 22–32, 41–43; FTC PRIVACY REPORT,
supra note 46, at 58–60.
121. See, e.g., Doug Brake et al., Broadband Privacy: The Folly of Sector-Specific
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it sees broadband privacy as sui generis, and deserving of more
stringent safeguards.
The Commission has detailed its views primarily in two
documents: a 2012 report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of
Rapid Change (“FTC Privacy Report”),122 and comments to the FCC
regarding broadband privacy.123 The views expressed in these
documents are not necessarily representative of how the FTC will
actually enforce Section 5 against broadband providers,124 and the
approach of the Republican-majority Trump FTC may differ from
those of the Democrat-majority Obama FTC. Nevertheless, they are
helpful guides to understanding how the Commission might enforce
Section 5 against broadband providers.
The FTC has articulated two significant respects in which the
privacy practices of broadband providers might warrant different
treatment from those of firms in other industries. First, though the
Commission has never brought a Section 5 action against a firm for
collecting non-sensitive information, it has stated that broadband
providers should offer opt-in choice for collection of sensitive and nonsensitive information alike through deep packet inspection.125 The
Commission stated in its Privacy Report that it “has strong concerns
about the use of DPI for purposes inconsistent with an ISP’s interaction
with a consumer, without express affirmative consent or more robust
protection.”126 It reinforced this view in its comments in the FCC
broadband privacy rulemaking, encouraging the FCC to require opt-in
consent for any collection of content data through deep packet
inspection—not just the types of information the Commission had
previously deemed sensitive.127
Second, the FTC has reasoned that broadband providers should
allow customers some form of choice before tracking their movements
across the internet.128 The basis for this view can be found in the FTC
Privacy Report, in which the Commission reasoned that firms should
Regulation, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 5 (Mar. 2016), http://www2.itif.org/2016broadband-privacy-folly.pdf?_ga=2.236078978.222908656.15172947111584549091.1517294711 (comparing FCC regulation to the (apparently monolithic) “FTC
approach”).
122. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at iii.
123. See FTC Comment Letter, supra note 110.
124. See FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at iii.
125. FTC Comment Letter, supra note 110, at 21.
126. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 56.
127. Compare FTC Comment Letter, supra note 122, at 20, with FTC PRIVACY REPORT,
supra note 46, at 58–60.
128. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 27.
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provide notice and choice where data collection is inconsistent with the
context of their relationship with users.129 Applying this principle to
the tracking of users across third-party websites, the FTC reasoned that
such tracking is “unlikely to be consistent” with the context of the webbrowsing experience.130
These statements lend a different perspective on the FTC’s likely
enforcement of Section 5 in the context of broadband providers’
privacy practices. If the FTC enforces Section 5 against broadband
providers according to its policy statements, there would only be two
differences between the commissions’ enforcement of broadband
privacy. First, the FTC would not require any form of customer
approval for first-party marketing that makes use of data not collected
through deep packet inspection or third-party tracking,131 whereas the
FCC would have required opt-out approval for the use of such data.132
Second, the FTC would likely require that firms provide only opt-out
choice for the collection of web-browsing and app-usage data by
broadband providers,133 whereas the FCC would have required opt-in
choice.134
C. Comparing FCC and FTC Regulation of Broadband Privacy
The FTC’s approach to regulating broadband privacy will likely
be quite similar to the approach embodied in the FCC’s since-repealed
Broadband Privacy Order. While the FCC’s rules would have been
more privacy-protective than the FTC’s enforcement of Section 5 is
likely to be, the FTC’s substantive approach is preferable from the
perspective of consumer welfare, because it will enable broadband
providers to compete in nearby data-intensive markets. In addition, the
FTC’s standards-based procedural approach is preferable to the FCC’s
regulation through prescriptive rulemaking, because it allows for
needed flexibility in quickly evolving markets.
1. Comparing the Commissions’ Substantive Rules
The difference between the commissions’ rules regarding firstparty marketing likely appears more significant than it really is.
Because the FTC has endorsed approval rules for the collection of
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 40–44.
Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 199.
FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 40–42.
Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 167.
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content data and information regarding third-party web browsing and
app usage,135 the difference in the commissions’ approaches boils down
to the treatment of information about a particular user’s current
subscription(s) to service. The FCC would have required opt-out
approval for use of this data,136 whereas the FTC would not require
customer approval.137 Because consumers rarely bother to exercise
privacy choices at all,138 the difference between an opt-out rule and a
rule requiring no approval at all is actually not as significant as the
difference between opt-in and opt-out rules would have been. It may
further be supposed that the customers who choose to opt out of
marketing are less likely to read marketing appeals in the first place.
Accordingly, the difference between the commissions’ rules on this
point is negligible.
The only remaining significant difference between the
commissions’ approaches is the treatment of web-browsing and appusage data. Thus, the determination of which commission’s privacy
regulation is more consumer-friendly will hinge on a comparison of
their approaches on this score. The FCC’s opt-in rule is plainly more
privacy-protective than the FTC’s likely opt-out rule. However, a
comparison of the effects of the rules on consumer welfare must take
into account the effect on consumers as a whole—not just the effect on
consumer privacy. More stringent privacy rules are not necessarily
better for consumers. Where data is an important input, rules that
restrict data collection, storage, and use run the risk of degrading the
quality of services, making data-intensive markets more concentrated
and harming consumer welfare to an extent that may not be offset by
the regulations’ privacy benefits.139 This is particularly true where
regulation has the effect of increasing barriers to entry.140
135. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 40–41.
136. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶¶ 198–99.
137. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 40–44.
138. See J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences:
Protecting Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 114–115 (2008).
One oft-cited example of the “stickiness” of default settings comes in the context of organ
donations. Though Americans widely approve of organ donation, only about a quarter
actually opt-in to the organ donation system. By contrast, organ donation is nearly universal
in countries that set the default at “donate” and require would-be non-participants to opt out.
See Steve Lohr, The Default Choice, So Hard to Resist, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/technology/default-choices-are-hard-to-resist-onlineor-not.html.
139. See DAVID S. EVANS, ED., PLATFORM ECONOMICS: ESSAYS ON MULTI-SIDED
BUSINESSES 222–24 (2011).
140. J. Thomas Rosch, Do Not Track: Privacy in an Internet Age, FED. TRADE COMM’N
20–21 (Oct. 14, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/
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Accordingly, one must evaluate the effects of the commissions’
rules on markets. The FCC did not engage in an economic analysis in
its Broadband Privacy Order. While it compared broadband providers’
access to user data to that of edge providers,141 the degree of access a
firm has to a particular input does not necessarily correlate to its ability
to compete in a given market.
The most obvious market in which collecting user data would
better enable broadband providers to compete is the market for
advertising intermediation. Ad intermediaries are firms that connect
content publishers with advertisers.142 Publishers sell space on their
websites indirectly to advertisers through intermediaries, who then
decide which ad to serve a given user based on information about that
user’s characteristics.143 This may be relatively crude data, such as
demographic information, or more detailed data, such as information
about a given user’s predilections and browsing habits.144
Increased competition is generally thought to redound to the
benefit of consumers, and there is no reason to think ad intermediation
is an exception. A lack of competition would likely lead to higher
prices for ad intermediation services, in turn lessening the take of
advertising revenue that content publishers see. This would likely
cause publishers to produce less content, which could be thought of as
a form of output reduction—the central harm antitrust law seeks to
address.145
On the one hand, allowing broadband providers to collect webbrowsing and app-usage data subject only to opt-out choice may make
the ad intermediation market more competitive by enabling new
entry.146 On the other hand, broadband providers may be able to collect
so much data, or may be able to collect data so cheaply, that they could
out-compete all other firms and achieve dominance in the ad
intermediation market. This would force other firms that wish to
compete in ad intermediation to first enter the broadband market in
do-not-track-privacy-internet-age/111014-dnt-loyola.pdf.
141. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶¶ 28, 37, 35.
142. EVANS, supra note 137, at 215.
143. Id. at 217, 241.
144. Id. at 241.
145. See id. at 246.
146. See Letter from J. Howard Beales III, Professor of Strategic Mgmt. & Pub. Pol’y at
the Geo. Wash. Sch. of Bus., to Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, RE:
Docket No. 16-106, Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications
Services
8–10
(May
27,
2016),
https://
scholarspace.library.gwu.edu/downloads/6969z0820 (describing higher regulatory burdens
on broadband providers as entry barrier).
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order to gain comparable access to data.147 New America’s Open
Technology Institute peddled a version of this argument in its
comments to the FCC, maintaining that allowing broadband providers
to collect customer data would enable them to “thrust themselves into
any other market where competitors normally must pay for intelligence
about and access to target audiences.”148
It must be noted at the outset that this is not an issue for antitrust
law: no one is claiming that permissive collection rules would grant
broadband providers a monopoly on ad-intermediation data, and even if
this were the case, antitrust does not recognize stand-alone “monopoly
leveraging” claims.149 Regulators, however, have more flexibility than
antitrust authorities. They may proscribe a practice where it threatens
harm to the competitive environment, regardless of whether it rises to
the level of an antitrust violation. Engaging in such “competitive
handicapping” raises concerns of its own,150 but first let’s explore the
case for handicapping here.
In order to evaluate the effect broadband providers’ entry might
have on the ad intermediation market, one must first understand the
dynamics of that market. Ad intermediation is a two-sided market:
intermediaries provide value by reducing search costs among
advertisers and publishers, connecting content publishers who have ad
Ad
space to sell with advertisers seeking to reach users.151
intermediation appears to accord with the general rule that two-sided
markets skew toward a dynamic of “winner take all” or “a few winners
take all,” given the presence of network effects and large fixed costs
that produce economies of scale.152 The market has become more
concentrated since the FTC determined in 2007 that it was “highly

147. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L.
REV. 339, 375 (2017).
148. See Reply Comments of New Am.’s Open Tech. Inst., In re Protecting the Privacy
of Customers of Broadband and other Telecommunications Services, WC Dkt. No. 16-106,
at 7 (Jul. 6, 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10707717014775/2016-07-06%20-%20OTI%
20Broadband%20Privacy%20Reply%20Comments%20FINAL.pdf. Note that the premise
of this comment is questionable. For instance, just as broadband providers gain income
from charging for broadband services, Google and Facebook gain revenue from charging
advertisers to display ads on their own sites, in addition to monetizing user data by selling
ads on third-party sites.
149. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1993); see also
Joseph Kattan, The Decline of the Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine, ANTITRUST 41, 41–42
(1994).
150. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 314 (1984).
151. EVANS, supra note 137, at 215–18.
152. Id. at 14–15, 213, 276.
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fragmented and correspondingly competitive.”153 One indication of
this is that Google and Facebook together account for about half of
display advertising revenue.154
Given the strong positions of Google and Facebook in the market
for ad intermediation, it seems unlikely that broadband providers’
collection of web-browsing and app-usage data would enable them to
achieve dominance. This is particularly true given that Google and
Facebook’s access to web-browsing and app-usage data rivals that of
broadband providers, if not outpacing it.155 Google and Facebook track
users’ browsing habits across much of the internet by loading cookies
onto websites for which they provide ad-intermediation or dataanalytics services.156 Their strong market positions are thus selfreinforcing: the more ad intermediation services they provide, the more
data they are able to collect. Google is present in some form on over
eighty percent of all third-party sites, with Facebook hovering around
thirty-five percent.157 Four other firms are present on between ten and
twenty percent of sites.158
Moreover, while a firm’s supra-competitive profits in one market
may in theory enable it to price below marginal cost in another
market,159 Google and Facebook would appear to have both the
resources and incentives to withstand a price war in the ad
intermediation market indefinitely.160 And it does not appear that
broadband providers’ costs of obtaining and analyzing data are less
than those of Google and Facebook, so long-term predatory pricing
would likely be unsustainable and therefore irrational.161
153. STATEMENT OF FED. TRADE COMM’N CONCERNING GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK 8, n.8
(2007),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/071220
googledc-commstmt.pdf.
154. See David Kirkpatrick, EMarketer: Google, Facebook Together Command 51.6%
of Digital Display Advertising, MARKETING DIVE (Mar. 15, 2017), https://
www.marketingdive.com/news/emarketer-google-facebook-together-command-516-ofdigital-display-adver/438129/.
155. See Peter Swire et al., Online Privacy and ISPs (May 2016 working paper),
http://www.iisp.gatech.edu/working-paper-online-privacy-and-isps; but see Aaron Rieke et
al., What ISPs Can See: Clarifying the Technical Landscape of the Broadband Privacy
Debate, UPTURN (Mar. 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60002077347.pdf.
156. See Steven Englehardt & Arvind Narayanan, Online Tracking: A 1-Million-Site
Measurement and
Analysis 11 (last visited Feb.
17,
2018) https://
webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/.
157. Id. at 8–9.
158. Id.
159. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 217
(1993).
160. See id. at 225.
161. See id.

82

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:58

The situation of large upstarts challenging entrenched firms in an
adjacent market is strikingly similar to one the FCC faced over thirty
years ago in its Computer Inquiries.162 For years, the Commission
barred firms that maintained a dominant position in the wireline
telephony market from entering the separate market for “enhanced”
wireline telephony services unless they did so through a separate
subsidiary.163 Eventually, however, the FCC considered doing away
with that requirement and allowing telephony providers, such as AT&T
and the Bell Operating Companies (“BOCs”), to enter the market for
enhanced services subject to less onerous safeguards.164 Enhancedservice vendors argued that the economies of scale enjoyed by AT&T
and the BOCs would allow those firms to eliminate competition in the
enhanced-services market, just as privacy advocates today warn of the
threat posed by broadband providers in the ad intermediation market.165
The Commission rejected this contention, however, instead accepting
AT&T’s argument that its entry would make the market for enhanced
services more competitive because it was a late, non-dominant entrant,
and because the enhanced-services market already featured large
providers such as IBM and GTE that would be able to compete on an
equal footing with AT&T and the BOCs.166
The situation in ad intermediation is more or less a repeat of the
debate over enhanced services, with dominant broadband providers
playing the role of AT&T and the BOCs, and Google and Facebook
playing the role of IBM and GTE. There is again reason to think that
the large upstarts’ entry will make the market more competitive.
Because their access to user data is independent of their presence
serving ads on other firms’ websites, broadband providers are uniquely
positioned to compete with Google and Facebook in ad intermediation,
at least in theory. Indeed, the mere threat of broadband providers’
entry into the ad intermediation market may be enough to constrain the
ability of Google and Facebook to raise prices for content publishing
and advertising services.167
And even in the unlikely event that broadband providers do drive
162. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 962–69 (1986) [hereinafter Computer III].
163. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).
164. Computer III, supra note 163, at 964.
165. Id. at 997.
166. Id. at 991, 1010.
167. See Bernard Caillaud & Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition among
Intermediation Service Providers, 34 RAND J. ECON. 309, 321–22 (2003).
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Google, Facebook, and other competitors from the ad intermediation
market, they would presumably still be faced with competition in that
market from other broadband carriers. It is unlikely that any one
provider enjoys sufficiently broad access to user data that it could
dominate the ad intermediation market, were Google and Facebook to
somehow abdicate their positions. Thus, allowing broadband providers
to track users across apps and websites is likely to drive down prices in
the ad intermediation market in both the short and long term, which
would presumably redound to consumers’ benefit in the form of more
and/or better content from publishers (which will have more funds to
invest in content development), as well as more relevant ads (because
advertisers, enjoying lower costs per ad, will place more ads). This
could be viewed as an increase in output, which is the central goal of
American competition law.
Meanwhile, the privacy harms occasioned by allowing broadband
providers to collect web-browsing and app-usage data appear relatively
insignificant, at least when compared with the potential harms
occasioned by deep-packet inspection. Whereas broadband providers
would theoretically have unparalleled access to content data if they
engaged in deep packet inspection to the full extent of their technical
abilities, their access to web-browsing data would be matched by at
least Google, given its presence on the great majority of websites and
its ability to collect data through both the Chrome browser and the
Android ecosystem.168 Indeed, Commissioner O’Rielly has argued that
broadband providers’ collection of web-browsing and app-usage data
would cause no harm to consumers, given that such data is already
widely collected and traded.169 O’Rielly is probably overstating the
case. Nevertheless, the point that regulators must focus on the
marginal harm of data collection is well-taken.
Accordingly, once one accounts for competitive effects on the ad
intermediation market, it is not so clear that the substantive rules
embodied in the FCC’s Broadband Privacy Order would have been
better for consumers on the whole. Indeed, from a general consumer
welfare perspective, FTC jurisdiction over broadband privacy appears
preferable to FCC jurisdiction.
168. See Swire, supra note 156, at 23, 75–77. 90–93; Petition for Reconsideration, In re
Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and other Telecommunications Services,
WC Dkt. No. 16-106, at 2–7 (Dec. 21, 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1221003408004/
Oracle_Broadband_Privacy_Petition_for_Reconsideration.pdf [hereinafter Oracle Pet’n for
Reconsideration].
169. See Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶¶ 216–17 (O’Rielly, Comm’r,
dissenting) (“[A]ll that the FCC has really done is raise the transaction costs”).
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2. Comparing the Commissions’ Procedural Approaches
Moreover, the procedural flexibility afforded by Section 5 of the
FTC Act is better-suited to broadband-privacy enforcement than is the
FCC’s prescriptive rulemaking approach. The costs and benefits of
privacy regulation are difficult to measure in general,170 but they are
particularly so in cases like this, where the extent to which the
regulated firms plan to collect data and the uses to which they plan to
put that data are unclear.171 As David Evans has observed, broadband
“and the Web are very new technologies by historical standards,” and
thus call for modesty on the part of regulators.172 Regulatory modesty
is particularly warranted in light of the staggering gains in dynamic
efficiency often brought by advances in technology173—gains that can
be blunted by overly aggressive regulation. The FTC’s standardsbased enforcement is more sensitive to potential dynamic efficiencies
because it enables the Commission to easily adapt its approach amidst
rapid change.
The comments in the FCC’s broadband privacy proceeding174
underscore just how speculative the costs and benefits of data
collection by broadband providers really are at the moment. The
discussion was characterized by vagueness on both sides. The FCC
was widely panned for failing to conduct a cost-benefit analysis at
all,175 and for failing to provide any evidence of perhaps its primary
justification for the Broadband Privacy Order: that the adoption of
privacy rules would speed broadband adoption.176 However, opponents
170. See Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 369, 392 (2016) (“Skeptics charge that cost-benefit analysis persistently
undervalues threatened harms that are diffuse, cumulative, and difficult to describe in
monetized, present-value terms, and that it therefore predictably works to the advantage of
vested economic interests.”).
171. See FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at C-7–8 (Rosch, Comm’r, dissenting)
(contending that the FTC should wait to see whether broadband providers will actually
engage in deep packet inspection before requiring such providers to obtain opt-in consent
from their customers).
172. EVANS, supra note 137, at 265.
173. See Thomas O. Barnett, Maximizing Welfare Through Technological Innovation,
15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191, 1194–96 (2008) (“[D]ynamic efficiency accounts for the
lion's share of efficiency/welfare gains.”)
174. See Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications Services, WC Dkt. 16-106.
175. See, e.g., Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 219 (O’Reilly, Comm’r,
dissenting).
176. One survey found that less than 0.5% of broadband non-adopters “report privacy
concerns as the primary reason for not subscribing.” Thomas Lenard and Scott Wallsten, An
Economic Analysis of the FCC’s Privacy Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, TECH. POL’Y
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of the FCC’s rule didn’t do much better in assessing costs and
benefits—an indication, perhaps, that those costs and benefits have not
yet become sufficiently clear to analyze cogently. For instance, rather
than offer specific examples of areas in which restrictive rules might
hamper innovation, AT&T pointed to past Internet innovations that the
FCC’s rules would have blocked, had those rules been in place at the
time.177 AT&T did mention that data collection and end use might
enable broadband providers to enter the markets for apps or “over-thetop ‘edge services’ ” such as video streaming or Voice Over Internet
Protocol (VOIP).178 But opponents of the FCC’s rules failed to explain
how access to data would enable broadband providers to compete in
these markets in a manner that would actually enhance economic
welfare, rather than simply shift profits from one group of firms to
another.
The technology of data collection, storage, and analysis is itself
still evolving, as well. For instance, whether deep packet inspection
will prove economically feasible will largely hinge on future advances
in data-storage technology.179 Likewise, whether privacy-protective
technologies such as encryption and VPNs might provide an effective
substitute for regulation remains to be seen.180 Waiting until costs and
benefits become somewhat more definite before deciding which
practices to condemn increases the likelihood that regulators will arrive
at the right result. This is the lesson of the Pennsylvania stop-lookand-listen rule in negligence law: novel circumstances may cast a
practice that has heretofore appeared unquestionably unreasonable in a
new light.181
Accordingly, the FTC’s measured, case-by-case approach better
lends itself to regulatory realism in this area. It allows the Commission
to focus on actual harms rather than speculative ones, and avoids
forcing it to predict changes in technology and business practices.
Meanwhile, the slow pace of informal rulemaking under the
Administrative Procedure Act exacerbates the inflexibility of
prescriptive rules like the FCC’s. As Jeffrey Eisenach has observed,
INST. 20 (May 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60002055729.pdf (drawn from data in
Bureau of Census for U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Current Population Survey, July 2015
(2016)).
177. AT&T Comment Letter, supra note 47, at 51–53.
178. Id. at 55, 59.
179. See Feamster Comment Letter, supra note 43, at 6.
180. See id.
181. See James Fleming Jr. & David K. Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct
in Negligence Trials, 5 VAND. L. REV. 697, 704–05 (1952).
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“once a rule is in place, it can take at least as long to modify or repeal it
as it took to pass it in the first place, creating the possibility that rules
designed to address an ephemeral problem persist long after the
problem is resolved—and so are transformed from cure to disease.”182
The FTC’s willingness to rely on a broader range of regulatory
measures than the FCC represents another source of flexibility.183 For
instance, the FTC has embraced self-regulatory models, urging firms to
collaborate on a standard “do not track mechanism” that would give
consumers greater control over cross-website tracking.184 In addition,
the FTC’s historically nuanced assessment of the manner in which
firms provide choice helpfully plays down the distinction between optin and opt-out choice.185 For instance, in its enforcement proceedings,
the Commission often emphasizes the prominence of a firm’s noticeand-choice mechanism over the issue of what type of choice the firm
provides (opt-out or opt-in).186 This flexible and nuanced approach to
regulation enables the FTC to achieve privacy goals in a minimally
intrusive manner. While the FCC may well have developed a similar
approach in time, the FTC’s long experience bodes well for its
regulation of broadband privacy. And while the FTC may lack
industry-specific expertise, its privacy expertise is likely more relevant
in the context of broadband privacy. Moreover, though the FCC’s
historical focus on competition as well as consumer-protection
concerns would appear to give it an advantage in regulating in an area
that incorporates both, this apparent edge was muted by the
Commission’s complete failure to address the effect its rules would
have on adjacent markets in the Broadband Privacy Order.
All told, then, there is little reason to think that consumers would
have been better off under the FCC’s broadband privacy regime than
they will be under the FTC’s Section 5 enforcement. As it considers
bringing privacy-enforcement actions against broadband providers, the
182. Jeffrey Eisenach, Broadband Competition in the Internet Ecosystem, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. 28 (Oct. 2012), https://www.aei.org/publication/broadband-competitionin-the-internet-ecosystem/.
183. See Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
529, 557-58 (2009) (“The FTC is much more comfortable with and inclined to consider the
potential use of self-regulation than the FCC”).
184. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 52–55.
185. Id. at 50–52.
186. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable and Monetary
Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Vizio, No. 2:17-cv-00758, at ¶ 23 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170206_vizio_2017.02.06_complaint.pd;
Complaint, In re Sears Holding Mgmt. Corp., No. C-4264, at ¶ 13 (Aug. 31, 2009),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/09/090604searscmpt.pdf.
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FTC should resist calls from privacy advocates to raise its threshold for
consumer choice regarding web-browsing and app-usage data.
III. THREE QUESTIONS FOR THE FTC REGARDING BROADBAND
PRIVACY
Several significant questions linger regarding the FTC’s Section 5
enforcement in the context of broadband privacy. Some were thrashed
out before the FCC, but warrant reexamination, while others concern
circumstances unique to the FTC’s approach.
A. Are Broadband Providers Special?
The most commonly heard criticism of the FCC’s Broadband
Privacy Order was that it failed to harmonize with the FTC’s
approach.187 This assertion is a bit puzzling, however, given that the
FTC has indicated that certain types of large platform providers,
including broadband providers, should be subjected to more stringent
data-privacy obligations than other firms.188 To be sure, split
regulatory authority over broadband would “not [have been] optimal,”
as the FTC acknowledged in its comments on the Broadband Privacy
Order.189 Hard regulatory boundaries can be especially problematic
when it comes to industries like broadband, where technology threatens
to swamp “the jurisdictional boundaries of the existing administrative
framework.”190 Nevertheless, no one disagrees with the premise that
some factors, such as access to data, do indeed justify different dataprivacy rules for different firms. Taking as a given the principle that
similarly situated firms should be regulated similarly, a key question
for the FTC regarding broadband privacy is what differences among
firms might justify differential privacy regulation.
The FTC has openly grappled with the issue of whether broadband
providers and other large platform providers should be subjected to
different privacy rules since as early as 2012. The Commission
evaluated the issue in its Privacy Report,191 and held a workshop on the
187. See Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 209 (Pai, Comm’r, dissenting)
(“[S]ince the beginning of this proceeding, I have pushed for the Federal Communications
Commission to parallel the FTC’s framework as closely as possible”).
188. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 55–57.
189. FTC Comment Letter, supra note 122, at 8.
190. Cohen, supra note 171, at 397; see also Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for
Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 46 (2002) (“[T]he Internet sows
confusion when it comes into contact with the dominant horizontal categorization approach”
embodied in the Communications Act”).
191. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 55–57.
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subject later that year.192 In the Privacy Report, the FTC started from
the principle that the privacy practices of large platform providers such
as broadband providers and the makers of operating systems and
browsers raise particular concerns because these entities have “very
broad access to a user’s online activities,” and are thus able to track
users “for purposes inconsistent with the context of [users’]
interaction” with the firm.193 Specifically addressing broadband
providers, the FTC reasoned as follows:
ISPs serve as a major gateway to the Internet with access to vast
amounts of unencrypted data that their customers send or receive
over the ISP’s network. ISPs are thus in a position to develop
highly detailed and comprehensive profiles of their customers—and
to do so in a manner that may be completely invisible. In addition,
it may be difficult for some consumers to obtain alternative sources
of broadband Internet access, and they may be inhibited from
switching broadband providers for reasons such as inconvenience
or expense. Accordingly, the Commission has strong concerns
about the use of DPI for purposes inconsistent with an ISP’s
interaction with a consumer, without express affirmative consent or
more robust protection.194

In a single paragraph, the FTC identifies three variables that may
justify imposing different degrees of regulation on different firms: the
visibility of the firm’s data collection; whether the firm has market
power; and the firm’s degree of access to user data.195 Let’s take these
issues one at a time.
1. Market Power
Both the FCC and the FTC appear to assume that a firm’s power
in the broadband market should be an important consideration for
regulators of broadband privacy. In its Privacy Report, the FTC
asserted that so-called “take-it-or-leave-it” choice is problematic where
competition offers customers few alternatives.196 It suggested that a
firm with market power should not be allowed to condition provision

192. The Big Picture: Comprehensive Online Data Collection, FTC (Dec. 6, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2012/12/big-picture-comprehensiveonline-data-collection.
193. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 55.
194. Id. at 56.
195. The Commission also noted that technological differences in and of themselves do
not merit differential treatment, cautioning that “any framework should be technology
neutral.” Id.
196. Id. at 50–51.
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of a service on whether users permit the firm to collect their data.197
The FCC echoed this view in the Broadband Privacy Order, prohibiting
“ ‘ take-it-or-leave-it’ offers in which [broadband] providers offer
broadband service contingent on customers surrendering their privacy
rights.”198 Even the late FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, a
longtime antitrust practitioner who dissented from the Privacy Report,
agreed that more onerous regulations should apply to broadband
providers with market power than to those without.199
However, it is actually not so clear that a broadband provider with
market power in broadband has any advantage over broadband
providers without market power when it comes to collecting user data.
Whether in a competitive or a monopoly market, the rational firm will
choose the combination of price and privacy protection that maximizes
profit. Assuming that users are able to understand and value privacy
protections—that is, assuming that privacy is not an externality—a firm
that is already charging the monopoly price for its service would have
no incentive to degrade privacy. Doing so would be tantamount to
increasing price—but again, the combination of price and privacy is
already set at the profit-maximizing level. Degrading privacy without
changing price could only reduce profits. In this respect, monopoly
providers are no different from providers in a competitive broadband
market. Whether in a competitive or a monopoly market, every offer is
take-it-or-leave-it: buy my product, or buy someone else’s (or don’t
buy at all).
If the assumption that users are able to properly value privacy
protections is incorrect, then there would indeed be no check on
broadband providers that wished to degrade privacy. However, this
would be equally true of providers with market power as those without.
Accordingly, market power in broadband cannot be said to provide
broadband providers the opportunity exploit consumers, apart from the
extent to which they are already exploiting them by charging high
prices. In the absence of price regulation, then, market power in
broadband services should not have any bearing on privacy regulation.
2. Visibility
The visibility of broadband providers’ data collection practices, on
the other hand, would appear to present a valid reason for asymmetric
regulation. In its Privacy Report, the FTC justified its conclusion that
197. Id. at 50–52.
198. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 294.
199. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at C-7–8 (Rosch, Comm’r, dissenting).
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broadband providers should be subjected to more stringent privacy
rules in part on the ground that they are able to collect data “in a
manner that may be completely invisible.”200 The FCC similarly
concluded that broadband providers’ data collection is less visible than
that of edge providers, because the latter “only have direct access to the
information that customers choose to share with them by virtue of
engaging their services.”201
The FCC’s phrasing overstates the case—a consumer can hardly
be said to have “consented” to data collection by invisible third parties
such as Google and Facebook simply by browsing third-party
websites—but the general assumption that broadband providers’ data
collection is less visible to users than that of other firms seems sound,
given that few customers are aware that such providers collect user
data at all. If this is indeed the case, it would provide a valid reason to
require more onerous notice requirements of broadband providers.
This is generally in line with the FTC’s insistence that firms give
“prominent notice” where their data collection is “[in]consistent with
the context of a particular transaction or the consumer’s relationship
with the business.”202
However, whether choice rules should differ based on the
visibility of data collection, as the FTC appeared to insist,203 is a more
complicated issue. While notice is the usual regulatory solution to
information externalities, choice is typically thought to solve for a
different externality: facilitating bargaining where transaction costs
would otherwise prevent it. If choice only helps users overcome
hurdles to bargaining for greater privacy protection, then the visibility
of a given privacy practice should not bear on whether choice is
required. Visibility presents solely an informational problem.
But the provision of opt-in choice also plays an important if littleacknowledged role in informing consumers. It incentivizes firms to
make their privacy notices clear and prominent, because firms will
want to encourage consumers to exercise the choice and opt in. This
may provide a rationale for subjecting less-visible practices to opt-in
choice requirements in situations where there is reason to believe that
notice alone may not suffice.
It may also explain the FTC’s seemingly anomalous stance in
urging the FCC to classify content data obtained through deep packet
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 56.
Broadband Privacy NPRM, supra note 18, at 2547.
FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 27.
Id.
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inspection as sensitive, and thus subject to opt-in choice.204 The FTC
had never before suggested that all content information should be
classified as sensitive.205 If it really held that view, it would
presumably have brought an enforcement action against Google for its
longstanding practice of collecting content data through Gmail without
requiring opt-in approval. The relative invisibility of data-collection
via deep packet inspection, however, may explain the FTC’s position.
3. Access to Data
Access to data is the remaining consideration the FTC offered as a
rationale for differential regulation of broadband providers in its
Privacy Report. According to the FTC, greater access to data calls for
more restrictive privacy rules, because it enables a firm to develop a
more granular picture of users.206 The FCC adopted this premise in the
Broadband Privacy Order, reasoning that broadband providers’
supposed access to more data than other large platform providers
justified stricter privacy rules.207
Whether broadband providers actually do enjoy more access to
user data than do edge providers, particularly Google, was hotly
debated before the FCC. The FCC concluded that they did,208
following the same finding by the FTC.209 A number of commenters
strenuously argued this conclusion was incorrect,210 particularly in light
of Google’s prevalence on other firms’ websites and in the markets for
browsers and mobile devices.211 Evaluating the issue in depth is
beyond the scope of this article, but it should at least be noted that
whether broadband providers have a data advantage over edge
providers is debatable. It is unclear whether broadband providers
actually do have access to more data; unclear how much value content
data adds to app-usage and web-browsing data; unclear whether
broadband providers will be able to monetize that data any time soon;
204. See FTC Comment Letter, supra note 122, at 20–21.
205. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 58–60.
206. Id. at 55–56.
207. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶¶ 28–37.
208. Id.
209. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 46, at 56.
210. See Swire, supra note 156; Reply Comments of the Int’l Ctr. for Law & Econ., In
re Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and other Telecommunications
Services, WC Dkt. No. 16-106, ICLE 14–15, (July 6, 2016), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/
file/10707812924625/ICLE%20-%20Privacy%20NPRM%20Reply%20Comments.pdf
(arguing that the quality of data broadband providers may collect is probably inferior to that
of edge providers, and that such data is thus more difficult to monetize).
211. Oracle Pet’n for Reconsideration, supra note 169, at 4–7.
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and possible that encryption will wipe out any advantage broadband
providers might enjoy. In addition, the issue of which factors a
regulator should take into account in determining which firm has
greater access to data is up for debate (e.g., whether regulators should
consider a firm’s superior data-analytics abilities, or economic barriers
to harvesting data in additional to technical ones).
More fundamentally, however, it is not so clear that a firm’s
greater ability to collect data (however defined) should necessarily
entail more stringent regulatory treatment. First, as described above in
the analysis of the effect that enforcement of broadband privacy might
have on the ad intermediation market, firms’ different positions in
secondary markets may warrant different treatment.212
Second—perhaps counterintuitively—greater access to data might
actually call for more lenient regulatory treatment. True, firms that
collect more data may be able to cause more privacy harm on a perbyte basis, because more insights can be gleaned from analyzing data
points collectively than from doing so separately. But the other side of
the coin is that the benefits of data collection by large firms may be
disproportionately large, as well, for exactly the same reason. This is
not to say that this is necessarily a zero-sum game: whether large
platform providers deserve stricter or looser rules will depend on a
regulator’s assessment of the benefits and drawbacks of data collection
in a particular context. How a regulator should make this assessment is
beyond the scope of this Article, which merely seeks to frame the issue
appropriately.
B. How Should the FTC Reconcile Broadband Privacy and Net
Neutrality?
Advocates of net neutrality argue that government intervention is
necessary to prevent broadband providers from discriminating against
certain types of edge providers. Now that the FCC has reversed its
decision to reclassify broadband as a Title II common carrier service—
rescinding its Open Internet Order, which imposed net neutrality
rules—the FTC and the Department of Justice will presumably be
tasked with policing anticompetitive discrimination by broadband
providers under antitrust law.
As Professor Paul Ohm has pointed out, however, enforcement of

212. See Computer III, supra note 163, at 985 (noting that regulatory burdens may differ
based on the “economic characteristics of both the service provider and the market for that
service”); see infra Part II.C.2.
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broadband privacy rules could be used as a backdoor means of net
neutrality regulation.213 Any privacy rules that prevent broadband
providers from scrutinizing the data that flow through their networks
could prevent providers from engaging in differential treatment of edge
providers, because broadband providers “cannot discriminate between
packets without scrutinizing them first.”214 The broadband privacy
debate is thus inextricably intertwined with the issue of net neutrality.
In enforcing its privacy standards against broadband providers, the
FTC will have to determine whether providers should be granted an
exception to monitor traffic for purposes of differential treatment.
Professor Ohm views privacy considerations as a kind of plusfactor that provides additional support for net neutrality regulation:
An architecture of discrimination is an architecture of surveillance,
one that can be lent out to intelligence agencies, copyrighted
content owners, and subpoena-wielding civil litigants to reveal
everybody's deepest secrets. A neutral network is a more private
network.215

In Professor Ohm’s conception, a procompetitive instance of
discrimination—say, requiring a video provider like Netflix to pay for
its disproportionate use of bandwidth, enabling broadband providers to
reduce prices for users—might be overcome by privacy concerns, and
rendered unlawful.216 In other words, privacy concerns may push
otherwise unobjectionable discriminatory treatment over the line into
unreasonableness.
The idea of taking privacy into account in considering differential
pricing of broadband service is effectively a dead letter, however, now
that net neutrality has become an issue for antitrust enforcement.
Consumer concerns such as privacy have no role in American antitrust
analysis, unless they can be folded into an argument that a particular
practice will decrease output.217 For instance, as Richard Posner has
pointed out, the fact that fewer cars on the road would lead to less
pollution would not be a valid defense in an antitrust suit against
colluding automakers.218
We might reverse Professor Ohm’s hypothetical, however, and
213. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV .
1417, 1490–96 (2009).
214. Id. at 1490.
215. Id. at 1494.
216. Id.
217. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Consumer Movement, 15
ANTITRUST BULL. 361, 362–63 (1970).
218. Id. at 363–65.

94

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:58

ask whether procompetitive or otherwise welfare-enhancing differential
treatment should save a practice that would otherwise be condemned
under the FTC’s privacy standards. There is no barrier to the FTC
considering non-privacy issues in enforcing Section 5 against a
broadband provider for its privacy practices, given Section 5’s broad
condemnation of unfair and deceptive acts and trade practices. While
allowing differential treatment to save a practice under Section 5 would
run counter to the populist version of net neutrality, it is logically
consistent with Professor Ohm’s proposal to treat net neutrality as a
concern of general welfare, rather than a narrow economic proposition.
And it must be pointed out that differential treatment of edge providers
is in fact often procompetitive. 219 As Jonathan Nuechterlein has
observed, not even the most fervent net neutrality advocate thinks that
broadband providers should never be allowed to treat packets
differently.220 Instead, the argument advanced by net neutrality
advocates is that broadband providers have too much power in the
market for Internet access, and could abuse that power by trying to
promote their own affiliates to the detriment of competitors in the
adjacent markets for applications and content.221 Where a broadband
provider discriminates against certain types of traffic not to favor its
own products, but instead to better allocate costs among the users of its
pipes, its action will generally by procompetitive.
The FTC should thus carve out an exception to its broadband
privacy standards to allow for differential treatment of edge providers
where such treatment is procompetitive and welfare-enhancing. This
would be akin to the exception in the FCC’s Broadband Privacy Order
for “reasonable network management” practices.222 The FCC found
that management practices are reasonable and therefore lawful where
they are “primarily used for and tailored to achiev[e] a legitimate
network management purpose, taking into account the particular
network architecture and technology of the broadband service.”223

219. Dennis L. Weisman & Robert B. Kulick, Price Discrimination, Two-Sided Markets,
and Net Neutrality Regulation, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 81, 97 (2010) (“By
creating incentives for an ISP to charge lower prices on the subscriber side of the market,
price discrimination on the content side of the market increases the total number of
transactions between content providers and subscribers—precisely the conditions under
which price discrimination is likely to increase social welfare.”).
220. Jonathan Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional
Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH . L. 19, 37 (2009).
221. Id. at 39.
222. Broadband Privacy Order, supra note 22, ¶ 208.
223. Id.
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Here, scrutinizing network traffic to the extent necessary to make
decisions regarding procompetitive differential treatment should
qualify as something akin to reasonable network management.
Failing to carve out such an exception could give edge providers
an incentive to use encryption tools for no other purpose than to
frustrate broadband providers’ attempts to treat their traffic differently.
Encryption in this circumstance would either make it more costly or
impossible for broadband providers to impose differential treatment on
different types of traffic, thereby reducing welfare. The relevant
question under Section 5 should instead be whether a firm has
exceeded the scope of its procompetitive purpose for collecting and
processing user data.
C. Will the FTC Prioritize Broadband Privacy?
As detailed above, the FTC’s approach to the substantive privacy
issues involving broadband providers will in all likelihood be largely
similar to the FCC’s.224 However, the effect that FTC privacy
regulation has on broadband providers will depend in large part on how
it monitors providers, how deeply it investigates them, and how often it
actually brings enforcement actions against them. This section seeks
guidance in the Commission’s past statements and its pattern of Section
5 enforcement to determine how its enforcement of broadband privacy
will actually play out. The FTC’s close scrutiny of Google, another
large platform provider, and the Commission’s responsiveness to
privacy concerns when they are raised in the media indicate that it is
likely to watch broadband providers fairly closely.
The FCC would likely have devoted considerable resources to
enforcing its broadband privacy rules had Congress not repealed the
Broadband Privacy Order, given that broadband would have been
essentially the only industry over which the Commission had exclusive
privacy enforcement authority.225 In contrast, broadband is only one of
many industries under the auspices of the FTC’s Section 5 jurisdiction.
The FTC brings only twenty-five or so privacy and data-security cases
per year, and does not have the resources to scrutinize every firm
closely.
Does this mean that broadband providers might fly under the
224. See supra Part II.C.1.
225. The Telecommunications Act also provides for the privacy of satellite and cable
subscribers. 47 U.S.C. § 338(i)(1)(A); id. § 551. However, the FTC also has jurisdiction
over these firms’ privacy practices, because the FCC does not regulate them as common
carriers. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
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radar, now that they fall within the scope of the FTC’s jurisdiction?
Answers are not easily found in FTC enforcement actions against
broadband providers prior to the FCC’s 2015 reclassification, because
the FTC has never brought such an action, save for a 2009 complaint
against DIRECTV and Comcast for violating do-not-call laws.226
However, this lack of enforcement actions is not particularly revealing,
because broadband privacy has only emerged on regulators’ radars
fairly recently.
Instead, given the FTC’s view that large platform providers raise
unique privacy concerns, the Commission’s treatment of Google may
provide the clearest hint of how it will scrutinize broadband providers’
privacy practices. The FTC has brought only one privacy complaint
against Google in its history, in a garden-variety failure-to-disclose
case.227 On the whole, however, it has monitored Google’s business
practices quite closely. For instance, the FTC in 2012 conducted a
major investigation into whether Google’s data-collection and other
practices warranted an antitrust enforcement action, though it
eventually decided not to file a complaint.228 There is thus reason to
think the FTC will examine broadband providers’ practices fairly
closely, as well.
The attention afforded broadband providers’ privacy practices in
the press may also increase the likelihood of FTC enforcement. The
Commission frequently files complaints on the heels of news reports of
invasive privacy practices—perhaps because it is responding to what it
perceives to be the will of the public, perhaps because sniffing out
privacy violations is easier when advocacy and media groups lead the
way. For instance, both the FCC and FTC privacy-enforcement actions
concerning the use of supercookies by Verizon and its partners
followed widespread media attention on the practice.229 And the FTC’s
226. Press Release, DIRECTV, Comcast to Pay Total of $3.21 Million for Entity-Specific
Do Not Call Violations, FTC (April 16, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2009/04/directv-comcast-pay-total-321-million-entity-specific-do-not-call.
227. Complaint, In re Google Inc., No. C-4336 (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/10/111024googlebuzzcmpt.pdf.
228. See Brody Mullins et al., Inside the U.S. Antitrust Probe of Google, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-u-s-antitrust-probe-of-google1426793274; see also Press Release, Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to
Resolve FTC Competition Concerns, FTC (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc.
229. See Natasha Singer & Brian X. Chen, Lawmakers Call for Investigation into
Verizon’s Use of Mobile ‘Supercookies,’ N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2016),
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/06/lawmakers-call-for-investigation-into-verizonsuse-of-mobile-supercookies//.
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2015 complaint against Nomi Technologies, a firm that tracked
customers around retail stores, came on the heels of a feature about the
company in The New York Times.230 Continued scrutiny of broadband
providers by consumer advocates and the media may thus make
privacy enforcement actions in this arena more likely.
CONCLUSION
Regulators are only beginning to grapple with the issues raised by
the privacy practices of broadband internet providers. Despite the
widespread assumption that the FCC’s governance of broadband
privacy would have been more robust than the FTC’s, the analysis
presented here suggests that the commissions’ practices are actually
likely to be quite similar. Nonetheless, a number of unanswered
questions remain about how the FTC will enforce Section 5 against
broadband providers. How the Commission answers these questions
will do much to determine how effective its regulation will be.

230. Joshua D. Wright, The FTC and Privacy Regulation: The Missing Role of
Economics, GEO. MASON U. L. & ECON. CTR. 14 (Nov. 12, 2015), http://masonlec.org/
site/rte_uploads/files/Wright_PRIVACYSPEECH_FINALv2_PRINT.pdf.

